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The “currency” of the next millennium is information.
Competitive advantage hinges on harnessing it and>guring out how to use it. (Rapp, 1998)
If information is the currency, then elec-
tronic technology-the hardware and software
that allows high-speed information transfer be-
tween fnms or divisions of the same firm-is the
banking system. It stores, creates, transfers, and
destroys the currency called information. The
rapid adoptioz even infitsio~ of electronic tech-
nology allows organizations to consolidate man-
agement fimctions. Decision-makers who are
geographically dispersed can increase their span
of control and coordinate their activities in real
time. From a single keyboard, prices can be set
for a variety of retail stores and/or individual
products that meet the sales objectives of indi-
vidual stores and of the overall company. Eve-
rything from floor plans, to work schedules, to
delivery routes can be supported from a central
computer.
For the most part, the biggest advantage of
this type of consolidation is the ability to save
costs—labor costs, redundant capacity costs, ex-
cess inventory costs. By coordinating the ordering
of supplies and services, fms acquire bargaining
power in purchase negotiations. Buyers can
achieve lower purchase prices, higher-quality
products, and better service born their vendors.
This ability and strategy has led to the belief that
power in the retail supply chain has shified from
manufacturers and national brands to retailers.
Electronic and information technology not
only allows consolidation%it demands consolida-
tion. In order to take advantage of the power of
information technologies and to realize the
economies of size and scope that become avail-
able once one has invested in the appropriate
hardware, software, and human capital, horizontal
and vertical integrations are inevitable. Electronic
technology demands bigger institutions, better
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trained personnel, and processes that are better
orgauized, more precise in their language, and
more consistent in their communications.
Green, Lanini, and Schaller (1996) point out
that technical innovations have always been ac-
companied by organizational innovations of equal,
if not greater, importance. Across the food indus-
try, innovations have historically centered on in-
dustrial procedures and operations involving
product development and desi~ presentation,
packaging, and handling. Quality control has been
hit-and-miss though HACCP programs have been
developed at several levels of the supply chain.
Logistics, inventory control, and strategic man-
agement practices received little attention until the
advent of WaLMart. By the late 1980s, Wal-Mart
had demonstrated to the retail world just how effi-
ciently a business could operate if attention is
given to the information provided by sales data
,and then used to coordinate supplies and negotiate
with suppliers. Wrd-Mart continues to demon-
strate the power of well-organized information
systems. By now, organizational innovations in
the rest of the food retail world are rampant.
These organizational changes, particularly the
horizontal mergers and the coordinated and inte-
grated distribution chains, are indeed of greater
magnitude and importance than the adoption of
information technology would have predicted.
Still, the industry appears to lag behind other re-
tail leaders.
New Opportunities
The opportunities presented to and utilized
by retail food establishments and their suppliers
started with the advent of the bar code. The UPC
code, developed in 1972, was fust put to use
with scanning equipment in 1974 at a Marsh’s
Supermarket in Troy, Ohio. When stores began
to scan groceries and other merchandise, they
also had to install some type of computerized
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Prices could be entere~ changed, and stored on a
computer, and shelf tags could be printed for
consumers’ information. This negated the need
to mark prices on individual items. Hailed as a
major innovation at the time, it saved labor costs
and helped lower food prices. Consumers pro-
tested the lack of item pricing but this protest
faded in all but a few locations when detailed
sales receipts showed consumers exactly what
they were purchasing at what price.
The same computers used to change prices
and scan purchases also gather incredible
amounts of sales data. Referring to frequent
shopper dat% Zimmerman (1999) wrote that
sifling through all the data gathered at the point
of sale is like trying to take a sip out of a fire
hose. No wonder this data was initially ignored
by retail grocers. Meanwhile, however, other re-
tail sectors—such as clothing-began to utilize
point-of-sale data to develop a “quick response”
system. With this syst~ merchandise that
flowed to stores was synchronized with its sale
by using scanner-generated sales data for con-
tinuous replenishment. Tracking customers’
buying behavior helped stores target their adver-
tising and promotions. Wal-Mart, for example,
has two years of sales data for each of its stores.
Internet sellers can track the “click-stream” of
buyers in order to find out tendencies and attrib-
utes of shoppers.
Initially, scanner data was touted as being
useful for inventory control. Store managers
could look at the data and know how low they
were on ketchup and when anew order should be
placed. But it took years before many retail food
stores used this data to reorder supplies. The
eyeball method, annual history of seasonal sales,
and experience were considered to be more reli-
able for keeping the shelves stocked than any
forecasting models that might emanate from
computer data.
Early on, analysis of the data was rele-
gated to third-party analysts, such as Nielson
or IRZ. They would analyze the data for manu-
facturers to help them decide which products
were the best-sellers and when the sales of
various products waxed and waned. Food
manufacturers’ marketing and promotion pro-
grams were built with this data. Slow-moving
items might even be dropped. But in that sys-
tem, information still reached manufacturers
~i$b a considerable time lag.
With the dawn of the computer age,
we are witnessing the birth of an industry.
It is as fundamental as, for example,
the pn”ntingpress, and the changes
itfacilitates are way beyond any
ori~”nally envisioned. (Pittmm 1999)
By the early 1990s, Wal-Mart and some of
their suppliers had figured it out. They designed
an information logistics system to harness the
power of this data. With compatible computer
systems and the willingness to share data with
suppliers, the information about what was mov-
ing over a scanner in a particular store could be
transmitted directly to suppliers (a ware-
house/distribution center) and/or a manufacturer.
Suppliers could adjust their supplies (or produc-
tion lines) according to consumer demand. The
food industries version of just-in-time delivery,
already popular in the manufacturing sector, was
born. By tracking the movement of products at
the retail store and making this information
available, in real time, to both the retailer and
their suppliers simultaneously, a continuous loop
was created whereby information about sales
flowed in one direction and product flowed out
in the other, just in time to match the retail de-
mand. To grasp the magnitude of this operation
just at Wa.1-Mart,it is usefhl to know that its in-
formation technology system is second only to
that of the Pentagon. It tracks all products pur-
chased over the previous 65 weeks. The infor-
mation is held in a product by store matrix,
which results in a data warehouse approaching
101 terabytes. Wal-Mart transmits 8.4 million
updates a minute to its distribution centers, and it
has electron data interchange (EDI) with 17,700,
or 20 percent of its U.S. vendors. About 200 key
vendors have direct access to the data warehouse.
They use it to replenish the stock in the distribu-
tion centers and to plan store layouts and product
placement and promotions (IGD, 1999).
Efficient Consumer Response
The concept of sharing information about
sales with vendors and developing a continu-
ous and coordinated flow of product was intro-
duced to the rest of the retail food industry and
institutionalized by a coalition of trade asso-
ciations (that is, Food Marketing Institute,
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manufacturers and suppliers (that is, Proctor
and Gamble and a few big grocery chains like
Kroger) under the name of efficient consumer
response (ECR) in 1992. It had little to do with
the consumer except that it tracked consumer
purchases and tried to tailor the delivery of
goods to match the volume being sold. The
goal of ECR was to have each food
store/company behave like Wal-Mart; to im-
plement EDI to order goods and slim down the
offerings in each category in order to stream-
line delivery and costs associated therewith.
This led to “category management,” which has
mainly limited success since it conflicts with a
goal of providing variety and service to con-
sumers. EDI requires compatible computer
systems, is expensive to set up and operate,
and most importantly, demands a willingness
to share information. Having computers at all
stores that could communicate with the com-
puters of all suppliers was asking a lot of an
industry made up of 130,000 disparate stores,
all operating on thin margins and accustomed
to treating their suppliers as adversaries.
Problems of technical incomparability and a
cultural resistance to sharing store level data
with suppliers resulted in a slow adoption of
the ECR agenda, though many of its goals have
been slowly adopted or merged into newer
programs.
A newer version of ECR bypasses the tech-
nical problem of compatible computer systems
by using the Internet to transmit information. It
still involves mutual commitment and trust by
partners in the supply chain. Again, Wa.1-Mart
launched this new system. In 1996, it joined
Warner Lambert in testing a “Collaborative
Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment”
(CPFR) system and studied the effects on the
sale of Listerine. This system involves the manu-
facturer and the retailer each forecasting sales for
some future period of time, sharing their fore-
casts, revising them if necessary, and then com-
mitting to delivering and receiving merchandise
on a prearranged schedule. In this system, scan-
ner data is transmitted in real time to suppliers
via an Internet interface, and the supplier is re-
sponsible for keeping the shelves stocked. “The
whole intent of CPFR is to establish trust be-
tween retailers and manufacturers” (Robinsoq
1999). Each party faces less risk of excess in-
ventory or stock-out in this system, and sales
tend to increase (Margulis, 1999). This should
help the business-to-business E-commerce take
off and flourish in the rest of the food industry.
In 1998, only 9 percent of retailers and 26 per-
cent of wholesalers were trying CPFR programs.
In 1999, 26 percent of retailers and 43.5 percent
of wholesalers were planning to try it (Blair,
1999). By now, Wal-Mart is using CPFR with
more than 7,000 (8 percent) of its suppliers
(IGD, 1999).
The industry is again working with the
Uniform Product Code Council to develop the
Internet protocol and standards so that virtually
any store and supplier can exchange informa-
tion (Amato-McCoy, 1999). Those who are de-
veloping software to allow CPRF processes
agree on the following trends in supply chain
technology: (1) integration of the optimization
process to increase profits; (2) collaboration
with trading partners to enhance efficiencies, to
reduce inventories, and to better understand the
consumer; (3) real-time data communication;
(4) shift from enterprise integration to advanced
planning and scheduling; and (5) co-
management of inventories (Food Logistics,
1999). These trends will transform the dysfunc-
tional supply chain from a supplier-push system
to a demand-driven system.
The advent and adoption of CPFR is
largely responsible for some saying that ECR
is dead, but the momentum and far-reaching
goals and activities set in motion by ECR have
led to much reorganization and coordination in
the industry. It encouraged, facilitated, al-
lowed, and even demanded that trading part-
ners talk with each other and explore the use-
fulness of the information held by retailers and
needed by suppliers.
Data collected from 100 stores in the Su-
permarket Panel Report to the Board of Advi-
sors, The Retail Food Industry Center, Univer-
sity of Minnesota (RFI, 1999) shows that those
stores that had implemented more of the data
management and coordination activities associ-
ated with ECR are indeed larger and have greater
productivity and more sales. With one year of
data one cannot say which came first, the ECR
practices or a well-organized and progressive
organization, but they are highly correlated. As
reflected in Table 1, those who had adopted a
high number of ECR practices were more pro-
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Table 1. The Adoption of ECR Practices by Retail Stores and Corresponding Productivity.
ECR Level Weekly AnnualSales Inventory Salesper
Readiness ofAdoption Sales/Sq. Ft. Growth TurnsNear Labor Hour
High $6.88 11.9’% 20.0 $98
Middle $6.15 2.6V0 18.6 $87
Low $5.27 2.7% 14.4 $89
Relationship Positive Positive Positive Positive
Source: RFI (1999).
The ECR index, developed by researchers at
The Retail Food Industry Center, has two compo-
nents (RFI, 1999). These components reflect the
adoption of technology and the development of
relationships with suppliers, two major problems
in the implementation of the ECR index. The re-
sults shown in Table 2 reveal that the single-store
retailers (SSR—independents) adopted the fewest
technological practices and the self-distributing
retailers (SDR) adopted the most. These stores
were only slightly ahead of the multi-store non-
self distributing (MSR) chains in the building of
relationships. The results reinforce the point that
the use of information technology allows and de-
mands larger organizations.
Table 2. Percent of ECR-Related Management




ECR IndexScore 32 56 63
Technology Component 37 51 63
Relationship Component 26 60 63
Source: RFI (1999).
Scan-Based Trading
Finding ways to streamline the supply chain
and to reduce inventory in the system has led to
experiments in “scan-based trading.” Participants
include many Direct-Store-Delivery (DSD) manu-
facturers and many of the larger retailers (Weiu-
stein, 1999). Under this system, the store does not
pay for its inventory until after it is sold—that is,
until after it is scanned. The manufacturer learns
what is moving off the shelf in real time and re-
plenishes it, often stocking the shelves them-
selves. This step saves labor costs to the retailer
and helps to alleviate stock-outs. The store re-
ceives a bill for merchandise in its store that is due
in 30 days, but the product moves out in 8 or 10
days. The store can use the revenue from the sale
for the rest of the 30-day period. In effem the
manufacturer lends the store an interest-free loan.
The store does not take a risk on buying inventory
that will not sell or might sell slowly. It improves
cash flow and reduces the retailer’s need for
capital, improving the return on assets. It saves
time when product is delivered because it does not
have to be checked in at the back door, and it can,
therefore, be delivered almost any time of the day
or night. It does have some demands, however. It
depends on mutual trust and 100 percent accurate
scanning. Since the manufacturer owns the prod-
uct until it is sold out of the store, slhe is not keen
on losing any of it due to sloppy scanning.
Most of the products being sold in a scan-
based trading system are delivered directly (DSD)
to retailers by manufacturers. Applying “activity-
based costing” (ABC) to store deliveries reveals
that it is less expensive for stores to receive prod-
ucts through DSD than horn wholesalers, espe-
cially if the DSD deliverers were using SBT
(Wellmu 1999). In 1998, 39 percent of retailers
and 9 percent of wholesalers were involved in
SBT tests; by 1999, 59 percent of retailers and 16
percent of wholesalers reported plans to test an
SBT system (Bla.k, 1999). DSD products tend to
be beverages and sweet or salty snacks. Sales iu-
crease up to12 percent, primarily because the
shelves are kept full by the manufacturers (Well-
m% 1999). Also, in-store promotions of these
products seem to induce a permanent increase in
their sales. Wellman (1999) calls this “consump-
tion elasticity,” which can now be known and
tracked due to direct sharing of sales information
between retailer to supplier.54 A4arch 2000 Journal of Food Distribution Research
Scanning
Scanning technology itself is evolving in
ways that could save labor costs in a store and
time costs to consumers. Whole basket scanning is
experimental. It will require new and upgraded
bar-code technology. We are creating systems that
make the old bar codes obsolete, even before they
have been perfected for all food produets. For ex-
ample, they are still being designed for variable
weight produets. For whole-cart scanning, a bar
code must be easy to place on any and every
package and easy to read through any package, at
any angle, and with 100 percent accuracy.
Self-scanning today, at the regular cheek-out
counters, is mostly away to pass store labor off on
consumers. Corbin (1999) reports that it is not ac-
tually any fmter but some customers think it is
faster because they have more control over the pro-
cess. Those stores that have installed it have not
experienced overwhelmingly favorable response.
On the other hand self-scanning by consumers as
they put product into a shopping cart would save
time and labor, but it demands more sophisticated
equipment. It is also in the experimental phase. AU
of these new scanning methods will require the
adoption of computer and radio-wave technology.
They will potentially save labor costs and reduce
consumer shopping time. Since these are two very
high priorities for both retailers and consumers,
useful adoptions will surelybe found.
New Demands
The fidl use of information technolo~ de-
mands larger networks of business partners, part-
ners that are willing to share information to their
mutual benefit. This requires a culture change in
most industries, certainly in the food industry.
Rapp (1999) points out that successfid business
and information strategies have rarely led to a
change in corporate culture. Rather, they have
been used to codify and institutionalize existing
cultures, core competencies, and organizational
structures. And these strategies and cultures have
been designed to use technology to improve prod-
ucts or service, or delivery. Mauy have tried to
used proprietary software in vertical organization
to control competitive advantage. This may be
what we are witnessing in the behavior of the
large wholesalers who are incorporating more re-
tail operations into their companies and expanding
their span of control and their assured customer
base. These wholesalers are beginning to look a
lot like self-distributing chains. Also, large self-
distributing chains, using the power of computer
information are doing their job better. They are
merging, becoming larger, and beginning to be-
have more like the acknowledged retail leader—
Wal-Mart.
On the other hand, the push by retail leaders
and the Uniform Code Council to develop a low-
cost Internet system, which all can use to connect
with their trading partners, represents a serious
attempt to change the culture of the industry. Ordy
if the new system is convenient, secure, and cheap
will stores give up their old practices, such as
buying inventory on a forward contract, keeping
their data secret, and making ordering decisions
by the eyeball method.
Having, and even using, information tech-
nology alone does not correspond with improved
performance. It must be integrated with human
motivations and organizations. Customers impose
limits on the system’s complexity. They are un-
willing to reveal some data for customer loyalty
programs, and they are unwiLling to substitute
their labor for that of store personnel. A@ em-
ployees’ ability to understand and manage data is
limited requiring intensive and continual training.
The use of tiormation technology requires
accuracy and precision that many do not have. In
the computer, numbers add up the same way
every time. Careless rounding errors or guessti-
mates by those who enter data are multiplied in a
computer, and in the en~ one can get very mis-
leading information. Computers are unforgiving,
and they cannot correct human errors or give out
information that is not requested. In a way, the
plethora of data sitting in retailers’ computer data
banks is like hard, dark diamonds buried in a large
mountain. At fist glance, they are ugly, hard to
extract, and the value of the raw product is uncer-
tain. Consequently, much of it has been ignored,
thrown away or examined by scratching on the
surface. So fm, only a few have invested in profit-
able mining operations, but when they do, unlim-
ited opportunities spring forth.
And when these diamonds are mined and put
to their highest and best uses, we will observe
some paradoxes. One paradox is that there will be
more vertical coordination in the food system.
Decisions about what is stocked and sold and
what prices are charged will be both more cen-Kinsey, .Jean Electronic Technolo~: New Opportunities and New Denranakfor Retail Food Stores 55
tralized and subject to negotiation. Business prac-
tices and processes will be more homogeneous
and rigid day-to-day but will evolve faster over
time. At the same time, consumer choice will in-
crease, with firms using their knowledge about
consumer segments to tailor products and services
to consumer niches. The market will be even more
driven by consumer preferences. Will this lead to
fewer or more competitive fm, or higher or
lower food prices? It may be difficult to even an-
swer these questions in the &tare. For example,
tie estimation of consumer demand equations
could become very difficult if every consumer
faces a different (unknown) price for heterogene-
ous products that they have custom-ordered.
IU thinking about the opportunities and de-
mands of iniiormationtechnology in the food indus-
try another quote comes to mind “Whereis the wis-
dom we lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge
we lost in information?” (Eliot 1934). To para-
phrase in this conte~ I would say: “Where is the
information in the data? Where is the knowledge in
the information? Where is the wisdom in the knowl-
@e?” me food industry and its analysts are work-
ing on the answer in an attempt to better serve con-
sumers andto stay profitable atthe sametime.
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